We show that informative political campaigns can increase political extremism and decrease voter welfare. We present a model of elections in which candidate ideology is strategically selected prior to a campaign which reveals information about candidate quality. Documented means by which campaigns can harm voters are not present in our model; special interest groups, fundraising, and biased or private information are not part of the analysis. Even under these optimistic assumptions, informative campaigns have negative consequences. Our results have implications regarding media coverage, the number of debates, and campaign finance reform.
INTRODUCTION
In recent discussion in the popular press, experts consider whether presidential debates are beneficial for voters. H.W. Brands' argument that debates decrease voter ability to choose an effective president is based on the idea that debates reward characteristics, like television theatrics or a willingness to pander to popular opinion, that may be detrimental in a president. Others, including Jon Meacham, argue that the debates are beneficial because they provide insight into how presidential candidates perform in unscripted environments. Our analysis shows how debates and other types of information revelation during campaigns may provide valuable information while also being detrimental to voters. The reasoning behind our results is quite different from other analyses. We show how information revelation about candidate quality during campaigns leads voters to make more-informed election-day decisions, but also provides politicians with incentives to adopt more-extreme policy positions. More-informative campaigns lead to elected officials being both higher expected quality and more extreme. The costs of extremism may dominate the benefits of more-information, and voters may be worse off as campaigns become more informative.
We are not the first to show how campaigns can harm voters. However, past results about the detrimental effects of campaigns tend to focus on the need for candidates to fundraise or seek endorsements from special interest groups, considerations that are absent from our analysis. In our framework, we show how campaigns may be detrimental even when there are no special interest groups, fundraising, biased or private information, or incumbent advantage. Campaigns serve only to produce costless, unbiased information about candidate quality. We are aware of no other paper illustrating that such neutral information revelation during a campaign can decrease voter welfare.
Our results suggest that anything that leads voters to become more informed about candidate quality also leads to the nomination of more-extreme politicians. This means that increasing media coverage of elections, more investigative reporting of candidate backgrounds, extending the duration of campaigns, increasing the number of debates and interviews, increasing interaction between candidates and voters prior to election, or lifting or eliminating caps on (informative) campaign spending may all lead to greater extremism and a decrease in constituent wellbeing. Conversely, imposing or strengthening limits on these factors may result in moderation and improve voter welfare.
Our model is not only applicable to the election of politicians. Consider instead two parties with different preferences over fiscal policy, who each make an alternative budget proposal. The 1 Both quotes come from the authors' columns in the NYTimes.com October 28, 2011 Room for Debate feature.
"ideology" reflected in a budget proposal-for example the total size of government proposed-may be easily observed. Nonetheless, details concerning the "quality" of a budget-the merits of the particular allocation of funds-may only be learned by debating, analyzing, and scrutinizing the budgets after they are proposed. Similarly, political parties may propose competing reforms on education, health care, tax policy, or military operations. Although the ideological stance inherent in these reform proposals may be obvious to the legislators, the overall social benefits of the policy reforms may only be revealed through debate or legislative hearings. In these settings, our analysis suggests that legislative hearings and extensive debate about the merits of alternative policies could have unintended adverse consequences as they lead to more-extreme proposals. We do not suggest that policy makers should cast votes without first becoming informed; only that policy makers and the electorate should recognize this tendency for extensive debate to lead to the proposal of more-extreme policies. Our results do not apply if the quality of policies or candidates is learned prior to nomination.
We review the literature in Section 2. Section 3 describes our framework and some preliminary results. Our model is stylized, designed to best highlight our main results. The key assumptions of the model are that candidate ideology is strategically selected (either by political parties or candidates who commit to policy positions) prior to a campaign which reveals information about candidate quality, a valence characteristic. Private information is not part of the model, as all players share the same beliefs about candidate quality ex ante, and campaign signals are publicly observed. 2 In Section 4, we illustrate how more-informative campaigns result in the nomination of moreextreme candidates. That is, as the signal associated with either campaign becomes more accurate, the ideologies of both nominees diverge further from the median voter's. This is a novel mechanism through which campaign information may be harmful to voters. More informative campaign signals lead to greater differentiation among candidates on election day. This softens competition along the ideology dimension during the selection of candidates, leading parties to select candidates away from the median voter and closer to the party ideal.
Section 5 shows that the welfare costs associated with this increase in extremism may dominate any benefits associated with more-informed voters (who are now more likely to elect the higherquality candidate). Even when fully-informative campaigns are costless, voter welfare may be maximized when campaign informativeness is limited. This will be the case when voter preferences are not too polarized; that is, when the share of voters in the tails of the ideology distribution are sufficiently small.
The analysis treats campaign informativeness as exogenous, outside the direct control of politicians. To the extent that televised debates and media coverage inform voters about candidate quality, 3 our results show how increases in the number of debates or the amount of media coverage leads to more-extreme candidates, and how reducing the number of debates or amount of media coverage could benefit voters. 4 In Section 6 we consider a number of extensions including one in which candidates strategically select the informativeness of their campaigns. In this section we also consider non-linear preferences and ex ante asymmetries between candidates. We conclude in Section 7.
LITERATURE
Our analysis illustrates how information revelation during a political campaign may lead to candidates running on more-extreme policy platforms and may lower voter welfare. We are not the first to show how political campaigns may make voters worse off. Related results in the literature, however, are driven by factors such as interest groups, fundraising, or endorsements, which are not present in our analysis. A number of papers consider the tradeoff between the informational benefits of political campaigns and the welfare costs of politicians needing to fundraise in order to run their campaign. Coate (2004a,b) considers this tradeoff when political contributions fund directly-informative advertising, and Prat (2002a,b) considers the tradeoff when campaign spending is indirectly informative about candidate quality (since voters make inferences about candidate quality through their ability to fundraise). In Chakraborty and Ghosh (2011) , candidates may pander to the media in order to gain endorsements. 5 In these models, political candidates pander to special interest groups in order to attract the contributions or endorsements which are needed to convey their quality (i.e., valence) to voters during a campaign. The presence of special interest groups, fundraising, and endorsements in these models lead to policy divergence, and can decrease voter welfare. These models implicitly assume that accurate and neutral information revealed during a campaign (in the absence of special interest groups) strictly benefits voters; we illustrate how this type of information revelation can lead to policy divergence and lower voter welfare.
In our model, information about candidate valence (e.g., quality, leadership ability, charisma, intelligence, ability to not screw up) is revealed during a campaign, after parties nominate their candidates or candidates outline policy platforms. Parties, candidates, and voters all have uncertainty about some of the information that may be revealed during a campaign (e.g., uncertainty about how the candidate will perform in debates, interviews and speeches, and how well he will run his campaign). Although this information revelation will affect voter preferences before election day, the impact the information will have is uncertain when candidate ideology is selected. As such, our model is related to the literature on probabilistic voting, in which candidates are uncertain about the preferences of the median voter when they announce policy. In this literature, policy-motivated candidates (or parties) react to uncertainty about voter preferences by committing to policy platforms closer to their own ideal than the other candidate (e.g. Wittman 1983 , Hannson and Stuart 1984 , Calvert 1985 , Roemer 1994 , Duggan 2008 . 6 Aragones and Palfrey (2002) model probabilistic voting when one candidate has a known valence advantage. Herrera, Levine and Martinelli (2008) show that both increased political polarization and increased campaign spending may result from increases in the volatility of voter preferences, which they model as aggregate shocks to voter bias in favor of one party or the other. In contrast to other models of probabilistic voting, our framework models the uncertainty about voter preferences, assuming that it is driven by uncertainty about the information that will be revealed during a campaign. This allows us to consider the impact of campaign informativeness on candidate ideology and voter welfare; considerations which are not present in the other papers. Finally, our model is related to a strand of literature in which candidates are defined by both their policy choice and their valence. In Groseclose (2001) and Aragones and Palfrey (2002) , candidates announce policy knowing that one candidate has a valence advantage. Other papers consider the choice of both policy and valence. Ashworth and de Mesquita (2009) and Carrillo and Castanheira (2008) assume that candidates commit to a policy position before choosing how much to invest in developing valence. 7 When candidates strategically invest in valence, Serra (2010) shows that candidates will be high-valence or policy will be moderate, not both. Campaign spending in Herrera, Levine and Martinelli (2008) and Meirowitz (2008) may also be interpreted as candidate investment in valence after committing to policy. 8 Rather than endogenize candidate valence, we take valence as fixed, but unknown. Our framework tells a story about the resolution of uncertainty concerning candidate quality, and how this expected resolution of uncertainty drives policy divergence in equilibrium. This is in contrast to the majority of the literature, where campaigns increase, rather than reveal information about, valence.
In addition to the theoretical literature, a large empirical literature analyzes campaigns, much of it focused on the link between voter information and other attributes of campaigns, for example spending (e.g., Partin 2001, Freedman, Franz and Goldstein 2004) , debates (e.g., Miller and 6 Bernhardt, Duggan and Squintani (2009) convincingly argue that when there is uncertainty about voter preferences, voters benefit from divergent candidate policies.
7 The choice of policy position affects the incentives for subsequent valence acquisition. Ashworth and de Mesquita (2009) show that candidates may choose divergent policy positions in order to soften valence competition in the second period. Eyster and Kittsteiner (2007) consider a similar tradeoff. Carrillo and Castanheira (2008) shows how candidates may choose policies away from the median voter's ideal in order to commit themselves to developing higher valence in the second period.
8 Bernhardt, Camara and Squintani (2011) present a model of repeated elections, where voters have information about incumbent fixed valence and endogenous policy choices, but only know the party of challengers. There, highervalence senior politicians are more likely to choose extreme policies. In another dynamic election setting, Camara (2008) considers the interaction between politician skill, policy choice and political advantage. He shows how even competent politician are unlikely to choose policy that decreases their political advantage. Sahuguet and Persico (2006) too show that valence differences cause policy divergence, but assume that candidates can engage in campaign spending to increase their valence. In equilibrium, campaign spending can reduce the valence gap between the candidates leading to more moderate policy. In this case, limits to campaign spending may increase policy divergence by reducing the ability of candidates to use spending to overcome initial valence differences. MacKuen 1979 , Holbrook 1999 ) and media coverage (e.g., Chaffee, Zhao and Leshner 1994, Bartels 1993) . No clear consensus exists in this literature about whether higher campaign spending increases the probability of a candidate winning election (See, for example, Levitt (1994) , Palda and Palda (1998), Milyo (1999) and Moon (2006) ). This lack of consensus is not central to our analysis; however, the link between campaign spending and voter exposure to information is directly relevant. As Partin (2001) points out, the link between campaign spending and voter information is clear, even if the same cannot be said for campaign spending and election probabilities.
PRELIMINARIES
An election takes place in three stages. First, two political parties simultaneously choose the ideology of their candidates. Second, the candidates campaign, a process which may reveal information about their quality, a characteristic independent of ideology. Third, voters elect a candidate.
A candidate's ideology determines his or her policy choice if elected. Although candidate ideology is perfectly observable by both parties and voters, uncertainty exists about candidate quality. 9
Quality represents an attribute equally valued by all voters; for example, a high-quality candidate engages in less private rent-seeking while in office, manages resources more efficiently, is better able to understand complex situations and react rationally under pressure, or is better at securing pork projects for his district.
Voters care about both the ideology and quality of elected politicians. All voters share common preferences for higher-quality politicians over lower-quality politicians. However, voters differ in their preferences over ideology. A continuum of voters exists, with ideology continuously distributed on the real-line. Denote voter i's ideology by ρ i . The distribution of voter ideologies is given by cumulative distribution function G(ρ), with continuous density function g(ρ). The median of the distribution of voter ideology is normalized to be ρ = 0. To simplify the exposition, we also assume that this distribution has continuous support on the entire real line, and that E[|ρ|] < ∞.
When a candidate with quality q w and ideology ρ w wins election, voter i with ideology ρ i receives payoff u i = vq w − |ρ w − ρ i |, where v is the relative weight that voters place on quality relative to ideology. Because we focus on an electorate composed of a continuum of voters, no unilateral deviation can change the election outcome. However, in our setting, if there were any chance that a voter were pivotal, every voter's ballot would express his or her true preference; we therefore assume that all voters vote for the candidate they believe offers the highest expected value if elected.
The two parties, L and R, have ideology positions ρ P L < 0 and ρ P R > 0. Parties care about the ideology of the election winner, but do not care about quality. Given that a candidate with ideology ρ w wins election, party R receives u P j = −|ρ w − ρ P j |. The parties choose the ideology of their nominated candidates, who then compete for election.
We use superscript P to denote when a variable or function applies to a party, and leave off the superscript when referring to a party's candidate. A party never prefers to nominate a candidate more extreme than the party ideal or with ideology on the opposite side of the median voter. Party L will always prefer a candidate with ρ L such that ρ P L ≤ ρ L ≤ 0 and party R will always prefer a candidate with ρ R such that 0 ≤ ρ R ≤ ρ P R . Define by δ P j ≡ |ρ P j | the distance between the ideology of party j and the median voter, and by δ j ≡ ρ j the distance between party j's candidate's ideology and the median voter. That is, δ j corresponds to a candidate's level of extremism. Focusing on δ j rather than ρ j in the analysis simplifies exposition.
We make the following assumption about party ideology:
This assumption guarantees that party ideology is always sufficiently extreme that parties choose to nominate candidates more moderate than the party ideal. Relaxing this assumption will not change the qualitative results. Because parties will never nominate candidates more extreme than the party ideology, the only consequence of relaxing the assumption is a potentially binding upper bound on policy divergence. When the upper bound binds, the welfare costs of improved information will be less, and the range of parameters for which more-informative campaigns will be detrimental to voters will be more restrictive.
Variable q j denotes the quality of candidate j ∈ {L, R}. Each candidate's q j is the independent realization of a random variable distributed according to N (µ, 1). This means that all candidates have the same expected quality, µ; therefore, the parties only make a choice over candidate ideology when choosing a nominee.
Following the nomination of candidates, but prior to voting, information about candidate quality is revealed through a campaign. During the campaign, candidates engage in debates, town hall meetings, and media interviews. Voters also observe how campaigns are managed, and investigative reporting may lead to voters learning more details about candidate background and past behavior.
All of this may help voters assess candidate quality. For example, the more debates and interviews that candidates participate in, the more informed voters will be about candidate quality on election day. To incorporate this into the model, voters observe a public signal about candidate quality prior to voting. For each candidate j, voters observe a public draw s j from a normal distribution centered around the candidate's true quality; specifically, s j is the realization of a random variable
The higher is σ j , the less informative the signal is about candidate j's quality; σ j → ∞ represents a perfectly uninformative signal which does not alter voters' posterior beliefs about candidate quality. Conversely, low values of σ j , imply that the signal is very informative about candidate quality; indeed, if σ j = 0 the signal perfectly reveals a candidate's quality. We focus primarily on a setting in which are (σ L , σ R ) are exogenous; however, in Section 6, we discuss an extension in which candidates choose campaign informativeness strategically.
We solve for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game that takes place in the following sequence.
1. Parties each nominate a candidate. That is, they choose the ideology ρ j of their candidate.
2. A campaign informs voters about the quality of each candidate. All voters observe the realizations of signals S L and S R about the quality of the candidates, where
3. Voters rationally update their beliefs about candidate quality and simultaneously cast ballots for their preferred candidate. The candidate who receives the majority of votes wins.
The model we present is highly stylized, incorporating assumptions about symmetry, preferences, and information which both emphasize our main results and make it most-straightforward to build intuition. Our results will continue to hold for at least some parameter cases in more-general settings, which we discuss in Section 6.
Focus on the median voter
Voters differ only in their ideology, which is defined along a one-dimensional policy space, and share common preferences over candidate quality. On election day every voters casts a ballot for the candidate that offers him the highest expected individual payoff if elected. Therefore, if the voter at positionρ is indifferent between the candidates, all voters to the right ofρ vote for one of the candidates, and all voters to the left ofρ vote for the other candidate. In light of this, the candidate preferred by the voter with the median ideology will win the election. 10
Probability of election win
Candidate L defeats candidate R if he is preferred by the median voter following the campaign.
where ρ M is the ideology of the median voter. Because ρ M = 0, this condition becomes
The left hand side represents the quality difference, for which a positive value means that candidate L has higher expected quality than candidate R. The right hand side represents the expected difference in ideology, and positive values mean candidate L is more extreme than candidate R.
For L to win, the quality benefit he provides must dominate any ideological disadvantage. Given that the signals, s L and s R are stochastic, neither candidate is able to guarantee that inequality (1) holds or fails to hold. We are therefore interested in the probability that (1) is satisfied given δ L and δ R .
10 If the median voter is indifferent between the two candidates, each wins with equal probability. This can happen in equilibrium only when σL = σR → ∞.
To determine this probability, we first present E[q j |s j ]. Given that q j ∼ N (µ, 1) and S j |q j ∼ N (q j , σ 2 j ), the posterior belief regarding q j given a particular signal realization s j is as follows:
Therefore, expected candidate quality given signal realization s i is just the mean of this distribution.
and (1) may be rewritten
Given the information structure, it is simple to calculate the unconditional distribution of the campaign signal S j .
We use this to find the distribution of the posterior mean of candidate quality:
From here we find the distribution of the left hand side of (2):
Define α as the variance of this distribution; thus the left hand side of inequality (2) is distributed according to N (0, α 2 ), where
Parameter α represents the overall level of campaign informativeness. It depends only on the standard deviation of the campaign signals, σ L and σ R , and is strictly increasing as voters observe more-accurate signals about either candidate's quality (i.e., as either σ j decreases). When both campaigns are fully informative (i.e., when σ L = σ R = 0), α takes on it maximum value at α = 2.
When both campaigns are fully uninformative (i.e., when σ L = σ R → ∞), α takes on its minimum value at α = 0. When one campaign is fully informative and the other fully uninformative, α = 1.
If functions F and f represent the cdf and pdf of the standard normal distribution, N (0, 1), then the ex ante probability that candidate L wins election given δ L and
, and the probability R wins election is F
EFFECTS OF CAMPAIGNS ON CANDIDATE IDEOLOGY
In this section, we show our first main result: more-informative campaigns result in the nomination of more-extreme candidates.
We now determine the parties' equilibrium choices of candidate ideology. In equilibrium, a party chooses δ j to maximize its expected payoff given the choice of δ k by the other party. The expected payoff to party j given ideological divergences (δ j , δ k ) is
The derivative of this function is given by the following:
This expression illustrates the tradeoff inherent in a party's choice of ideology. If the party nominates a marginally more extreme candidate, then they experience a marginal benefit whenever their candidate wins election, reflected in the first term. However, by doing so, the party also reduces the probability of winning the election, a cost reflected in the second term. Therefore a critical point of a party's expected payoff (as a function of its level of ideological divergence) is defined by the following equation:
Consider the sign of the derivative at δ j = 0. For the standard Normal distribution, (3) and applying this inequality gives:
Therefore, for values of δ j near zero, the party's expected payoff is increasing in δ j (for any δ k ).
Because the Normal distribution is log-concave,
is a decreasing function, and because the argument
is itself decreasing in δ j , the left hand side of this equation is increasing in δ j .
Meanwhile, the right hand side is decreasing, approaching a limit of zero as δ j → ∞. Thus a unique value of δ j satisfies equation (3). In addition, the unique critical value satisfying this
f (x) 2 = 1 + xR(x) > 1. Thus, R(x) > x holds at x = 0, and for all x > 0, R (x) > 1. Thus, x > 0 ⇒ R(x) > x. Inverting each side of this inequality gives the inequality given in the text. equation always defines a maximum: the derivative at δ j = 0 is positive and changes sign (only once) at the critical point. Hence, a unique critical point always exists, and it is always the unique global maximum of the party's expected payoff. Therefore, party j's best response to δ k is uniquely defined by the value of δ j satisfying (3). Equilibrium party ideologies (δ L , δ R ) are therefore defined by the following system of equations:
These equations immediately imply the following:
Using these observations, we derive the unique equilibrium of the game. Suppose that δ k = δ * .
The critical point in equation (3) is therefore defined by
In equilibrium, this critical point must be δ j = δ * . Therefore δ * must satisfy the following:
4 α. We omit the argument α whenever doing so does not cause confusion. We therefore find the following result.
Proposition 4.1 The unique equilibrium of this game is
4 α, the more divergent are the ideologies of both candidates, and the more extreme they are compared to the preferences of the median voter. Unsurprisingly, equilibrium ideological divergence δ * is increasing in v. Higher v means the voter cares less about candidate ideology relative to candidate quality. Thus, when v is high the marginal cost of increasing extremism-a reduction in the probability of being elected-is smaller, leading to greater ideological extremism in equilibrium.
Our first main result describes the relationship between equilibrium extremism and campaign informativeness: the divergence between candidate ideology and the median voter's ideology, δ * , is strictly increasing in α. The more informative are campaigns, the more divergent are the ideologies of the nominated candidates.
Proposition 4.2 (Informativeness and ideological extremism)
• ∂δ * ∂α > 0. Both candidates become more extreme as either campaign becomes more informative.
• δ * = 0 if and only if σ L , σ R → ∞. Candidate ideology converges to the median voter only when campaigns are completely uninformative.
When campaigns are completely uninformative, both candidates remain undistinguishable on the quality dimension following the campaign. In this case, the more-moderate candidate always wins, and party competition to nominate a more-moderate candidate than the other party results in nominees who share the same ideology as the median voter. On the other hand, when campaigns reveal information about candidate quality, then the more moderate candidate is not guaranteed to win the election. The parties recognize that campaigns will expose differences in expected candidate quality, and that a candidate with higher ex post expected quality can still win election when his ideology is moderately more extreme than his opponent. Parties react to the anticipated revelation of information about quality by nominating more-extreme candidates in the first stage. Thus, in equilibrium, informative campaign signals undermine the incentive for parties to moderate the ideology of their nominees, resulting in an equilibrium with a higher level of ideological extremism. 12
VOTER WELFARE
Since more-informative campaigns result in both more-extreme candidates and more-informed voters, it is not initially clear whether voters may benefit from less informative campaigns. Continuing the analysis from the previous section we show that the downsides of more information may dominate the benefits, and voter welfare may benefit from less informative campaigns.
Total voter welfare is measured as the utilitarian sum of voter payoffs. Given that a politician with ideology ρ * and quality q * wins election, welfare equals
where
is the average voter utility loss due to divergence between an election winner's ideology and the preferred ideologies of the individual voters. The expression for L(ρ w ) may be rewritten:
As is evident from equation (4), the voter welfare loss associated with election winner ideology is minimized when G(ρ w ) = 1 2 . That is, when the election winner ideology equals that of the median voter, ρ w = ρ M = 0. As the distance between ρ w and ρ M = 0 increases, the welfare loss associated with ideology increases.
Although the welfare cost of extremism is smallest when candidates share the ideology of the median voter, such candidates are not nominated in equilibrium. Only when α = 0, that is, when both campaigns are completely uninformative about candidate quality, do parties choose δ R = δ L = 0 (or equivalently ρ R = ρ L = 0). Whenever α > 0, candidate ideology will diverge from the median voter's ideology, with this distance increasing as either campaign becomes more informative. Therefore, the ideological extremism caused by informative campaigns imposes a cost on voters.
At the same time that an informative campaign causes divergence in candidate ideology, damaging voter welfare, it also results in voters being more informed about candidate quality and more likely to elect the higher-quality candidate, improving welfare. Because in equilibrium both parties choose equally extreme candidates, i.e., δ * R = δ * L , voters elect the candidate who has the higher expected quality following the realization of the campaign signals. The election winner is the candidate who's posterior quality distribution has the higher posterior mean.
Given quality-signal realizations s L and s R , the expected quality of the election winner is given by
We have already shown that before the signal is realized, the posterior mean of quality
). Therefore, the expected quality of the election winner is given by
. Using a standard formula, this expectation evaluates to
The expected quality of the election winner is strictly increasing in overall campaign informativeness, α, and therefore also increasing in the informativeness of the individual campaigns.
Increases in campaign informativeness therefore have two confounding effects: the expected quality of the election winner increases, benefitting voters, and parties nominate candidates with more-extreme ideologies, hurting voters. To understand the interaction of these effects, we consider expected aggregate equilibrium welfare as a function of α:
Differentiating this expression gives the derivative of social welfare with respect to α:
From this expression for the derivative we conclude that voter welfare is increasing in informativeness when
That is, the electorate benefits from an increase in campaign informativeness when a sufficiently large portion of the voter population have ideologies which are more-extreme than the equilibrium ideology of the candidates. Conversely, ∂EW (α) ∂α < 0 and the electorate benefits from a decrease in campaign informativeness when a sufficiently large portion of the voter population has moremoderate ideologies than the nominated candidates.
This result is quite intuitive. While a small increase in campaign informativeness increases extremism, the increased extremism does not impose a welfare cost on a voter with ideological preference outside of the interval (−δ * (α), δ * (α)). While one candidate moves further from the voter's ideal ideology, the other candidate moves toward the voter's preferred ideology. Because each candidate is equally likely to win election in equilibrium, these effects offset. Thus voters with relatively extreme ideologies only benefit from increased campaign informativeness, as it allows them to select higher-quality candidates. However, voters with ideological preference inside (−δ * (α), δ * (α)) are "doubly" hurt by extremism, as the ideological position of each candidate moves away from their preferred position. If the mass of voters in this interval is relatively high, then the welfare cost of extremism on moderate voters dominates the informational benefits for all voters.
Momentarily ignoring the restriction that α ≤ 2, it is easy to see that aggregate voter welfare is maximized for the valueα that solves
When both campaigns are fully informative about candidate quality, then α = 2, and no higher α is possible. Therefore, ifα ≥ 2, the welfare maximizing α is a corner solution at α = 2. Wheñ α < 2, then voters are best off when campaigns are less than fully informative. This is the case
That is, if a sufficient portion of the voter population is more moderate than the candidates who are nominated when campaigns are fully informative, then voter welfare is maximized by less-than-fully informative campaigns.
Proposition 5.1 (Information and voter welfare) When inequality (5) holds, aggregate expected voter welfare is maximized by someα ∈ (0, 2), that is, when campaigns are less-than-fully informative about candidate quality. Otherwise, aggregate expected voter welfare is maximized when campaigns are fully informative.
In addition to α, two other factors affect the value of G(δ * (α)) − G(δ * (α)), and therefore determine the welfare impact of increased informativeness. The first is how "condensed" the distribution of voter ideology is around the ideology of the median voter; the second is how much voters care about quality relative to ideology, v. The more condensed the distribution of voter ideology is around the ideology of the median voter, the larger is G(δ * (α)) − G(δ * (α)). If voter ideology is normally distributed, for example, then a more-condensed (i.e., lower-variance) distribution corresponds to a larger share of the population with more moderate ideology than the candidates. In this case, (as described above) candidate extremism imposes a welfare cost on a larger portion of the electorate; If enough voters bear this cost, overall welfare is hurt (despite the benefits). Second, (as previously described) the more voters care about politician quality relative to ideology (i.e., the higher is v), the less a candidate's probability of winning depends on his or her ideology. Parties respond by nominating candidates with more-extreme ideologies. This means that given any α, a larger v leads to a larger portion of the population that is less extreme than the candidates, i.e., a larger value for G(δ * (α)) − G(δ * (α)).
These considerations are important for two reasons. First, they imply that if v is sufficiently large or the ideology distribution is sufficiently concentrated around the median, then voter welfare is maximized when campaigns are less-than-fully informative. For lower v and more spread out ideology distributions, voters strictly benefit from more informative campaigns. Second, they imply that for any α > 0, there exists sufficiently high values of v and sufficiently concentrated ideology distributions such that voters would be made better off by a decrease in campaign informativeness.
An interesting related result involves the relationship between the welfare maximizing level of campaign informativeness and v, the parameter representing how much voters care about politician qualifications.
Proposition 5.2 If inequality (5) holds, then
∂α ∂v < 0. The welfare maximizing level of campaign informativeness is decreasing in the value for candidate quality.
We provide a formal proof in the appendix.
The result is paradoxical. When voters care more about electing high-quality candidates, they are better off when the campaign reveals less about candidate quality. As the intensity of voter preferences for quality increases, the optimal level of campaign informativeness decreases, even though less informative campaigns make it less likely that voters elect the more-qualified candidate. This is because any increase in α has a larger impact on δ * when v is high compared to when v is low. Higher v means candidate ideology is more sensitive to changes in campaign informativeness.
As a result, the welfare-maximizing level of campaign informativeness decreases as v increases.
Finally, it is important to point out thatα never equals 0. That is, completely uninformative campaigns are never optimal for voter welfare. Under certain conditions, however, voters are better off under a completely uninformative campaign (i.e., α = 0) compared to campaigns that are very informative (i.e., α sufficiently large).
ALTERNATIVE ASSUMPTIONS
The above analysis relies on a stylized model which focuses on developing intuition for our main result and highlighting our contribution to the literature. As always, a variety of alternative assumptions may have been used. Here, we discuss three of the more-interesting alternatives in an effort to further develop intuition regarding which assumptions are responsible for our results.
CONCAVE COST OF IDEOLOGICAL DIVERGENCE
In the Appendix, we reconsider the analysis under the assumption that voter and party preferences are concave in ideology. The analysis considers separately voter and party preferences, in order to isolate whether the linearity of either group's utility drives our results.
When party utility is concave in the difference between their own ideal and the ideology of the election winner, the qualitative results from the earlier analysis continue to hold: increased campaign informativeness results in ideology divergence, and this has the potential to decrease voter welfare (when the distribution of voters is sufficiently concentrated around the median).
When voter utility is concave in policy, increased campaign informativeness results in ideology divergence. However, this divergence has the potential to decrease voter welfare only if voter payoffs are not too concave. If we want to maintain the same concavity for the preferences of both voters and parties, then the same logic applies. We show that more informative campaigns lead to greater divergence in candidate ideology, and that this divergence can decrease overall voter welfare only if preferences are not too concave.
ASYMMETRIC EXPECTED QUALITY
Our analysis focuses on the case in which parties and their potential pool of candidates are ex ante undifferentiated: the initial expected quality of the candidate nominated by either party is identical. This is a natural assumption, and we see no reason that the distribution of candidate quality should differ by party. Under an alternative interpretation of our model, however, the parties are actually two competing, policy-motivated candidates on opposite sides of the median voter commit to their own policy platforms at the beginning of their campaigns. In this case, it is perfectly reasonable to assume that the two candidates have ex ante differences in expected quality.
In the Appendix, we show that the results extend in a natural way when the difference in expected candidate quality is not too pronounced. In equilibrium, the party whose candidate is expected to be higher quality capitalizes on his advantage by selecting a more-extreme ideology than in the symmetric equilibrium, while the initially disadvantaged party chooses a more-moderate ideology. When the difference in prior qualities is not too large, even the (moderate) disadvantaged party does not converge to the ideology of the median voter, and in equilibrium each party is equally likely to win election. Just as in the symmetric case, if the distribution of voter tastes is sufficiently concentrated about the median, then increasing the informativeness of campaign signals decreases aggregate voter welfare.
ENDOGENOUS CAMPAIGN INFORMATIVENESS
Until now, the analysis assumes σ L and σ R are exogenous. However, it is reasonable to think that the informativeness of the signals observed by voters can be influenced by campaign strategy.
By giving interviews, participating in debates and town hall meetings, and spending money on informative advertising, candidates improve the accuracy of voter perceptions about their quality, without knowing exactly what these perceptions will be. 13
In the appendix, we incorporate the strategic choice of individual campaign informativeness σ i into the previous framework. Otherwise, the players, preferences and timing of the previous game are unchanged. In the second stage, once candidates have been nominated and ideologies set, each candidate simultaneously chooses the informativeness σ j of his or her campaign signal. These signals are simultaneously realized, and the election is held. We allow for an exogenous limit on campaign informativeness, which can be loosely interpreted as a campaign spending limit.
The sequentially rational choice of campaign informativeness is straightforward: whenever the extremism of the parties is different, δ L = δ R , the candidate with more-moderate ideology chooses a completely uninformative campaign, while the candidate with more-extreme ideology chooses the most-informative campaign possible. Intuitively, the more-moderate candidate has an advantage and has no reason to run the risk of generating an unfavorable quality signal. The more-extreme candidate is disadvantaged, and must generate a campaign signal that strongly suggests high quality in order to have a chance to win election. If both candidates choose the same level of ideological extremism, then, regardless of the choice of campaign informativeness, then both have the same probability of winning election. In a symmetric equilibrium any choices of informativeness can arise on the equilibrium path. 14 We demonstrate that when campaign informativeness is endogenous, qualitatively similar results hold. Allowing more informative campaigns (relaxing limits to campaign spending or fundraising) increases extremism. Furthermore, this increase in extremism decreases voter welfare if the elec-13 At the time that the campaign chooses the informativeness of the signal, the campaign does not know the signal realization, as the signal realization is determined by the candidate's performance in the debates or interviews and the inferences voters draw from the candidate's ads.
14 Interpret campaign expenditures as a proxy for activities that improve the informativeness of the signal observed by voters. Then our results suggest that if the difference in the ex ante expected quality of candidates is small, then observed campaign expenditures do not affect the probability of winning the election. This is reminiscent of a strand of empirical research that finds little evidence linking campaign expenditures and election probabilities: Levitt (1994) , Palda and Palda (1998) ; see also Milyo (1999) and Moon (2006) ).
torate is sufficiently concentrated around the median voter.
CONCLUSION
Both the academic literature and the policy debate on campaign finance reform view special interest groups as a potentially corrupting influence on politicians, who may deviate from choosing policies preferred by their constituents in order to raise the funds needed to run for election. 15 Eliminating special interest money from politics, it is often argued, will eliminate politician pandering to wealthy special interests and encourage policy choices aimed at maximizing constituent welfare. Writing in support of providing candidates with public money (e.g., tax revenue) to fund their campaigns, CommonCause.org argues Instead of focusing on jobs and the economy, health care, and the mortgage crisis, elected officials in Washington spend too much time raising money from the lobbyists and industries theyre supposed to oversee. Its time to get our elected officials out of the fundraising game and let them do the job we elected them to do. 16 We do not deny that eliminating private funding of political campaigns reduces the incentives politicians have to act in favor of wealthy interest groups. Our analysis suggests, however, that eliminating private funding in no way guarantees that candidates act to maximize constituent welfare. If campaigns reveal information about candidate quality, then even in the absence of special interest groups and fundraising, candidate ideology diverges from the median voter.
As such, limiting the informativeness of campaigns can lead to more moderate candidates and improve voter welfare. The results have implications for any activity during a campaign the improves voter information about candidate quality. To the extent that debates are informative about quality (a claim that a variety of empirical evidence supports, including Miller and MacKuen (1979) and Holbrook (1999) ), our results suggest that an increased quantity of debates, or a change in debate format that is anticipated to reveal more information about the candidates, can lead to more-extreme candidates and lower voter welfare. Similar results apply to increased media coverage, suggesting that more detailed coverage of candidates and elections in the media can have similar effects. They also apply to changes in campaign spending or campaign finance reform policies which may affect the amount of information revealed about candidates during a campaign.
Our analysis illustrates how seemingly benign changes in debates, media coverage, and campaign finance may lead to more extreme policy and may have unintended welfare consequences.
APPENDIX

ASSUMING PREFERENCE CONCAVITY
This section determines if and how the results depend on our assumption that voters and parties have linear preferences, as opposed to preferences that are concave in the difference between one's ideal policy and the policy implemented by the election winner. To do this, we incorporate concave preferences into the analysis. We consider separately concave voter and concave party preferences, in order to isolate the impact of voter versus party concavity on our results.
The following analysis assumes that voter ideology is distributed around the median voter according to N (0, r 2 ). The variance r represents how concentrated the population is around the median, with large r denoting a wide range of popular opinion, and r → 0 representing a special case where the entire voter population shares the same ideology.
Voter concavity
For voters, we assume power utility over policy outcomes, where
The parameter β ≥ 1 represents how concave voter preferences are with respect to policy. The body of the paper considers β = 1; here we do not constrain the parameter to either value. To win election, a candidate must still be preferred by the median voter, who has ρ M = 0. Therefore,
Given the distribution of q j and s j , we can rewrite the condition
Where the left hand side is distributed according to N (0, α 2 ), where
is our measure of campaign informativeness. The only difference between equations (6) and (2) is that the right hand side now has general β rather than β = 1. Candidate L wins the election with probability
, and candidate R wins with probability F (
. Solving for the equilibrium value of δ * L = δ * R = δ * using the same procedure as in the body of the paper gives
Notice that the ideology of both candidates becomes more extreme as either campaign becomes more informative (increasing α).
To determine the impact of campaign informativeness on voter welfare, we rewrite the ideology loss function L from the earlier analysis:
The loss is minimized when the ideology of the election winner equals the ideology of the median voter, ρ w = ρ M = 0, and is strictly increasing as ρ w diverges from 0. Writing the loss L as a function of δ * gives
Expected voter welfare equals
The impact that campaign informativeness has on voter welfare depends on the concavity of the voter payoff function.
Plugging in to ∂δ * ∂α , this becomes
When voter payoffs are linear, as they are in the body paper, there always exists sufficiently large v or sufficiently concentrated distribution of voters (as indicated by our parameter r) such that ∂EW ∂α < 0; that is, such that increasing α decreases voter welfare. Assuming quadratic voter policy utility (i.e., assuming β = 2) is already sufficiently concave that increasing campaign informativeness strictly increases voter welfare. When β = 2, there does not exist parameters such that ∂EW ∂α < 0, and as such the voters always benefit from an increase in campaign informativeness. To see this,
an expression which is always positive given v > 0.
This implies that there exists a value of β between 1 and 2 such that with lower β there exists parameters under which more informative campaigns decrease voter welfare.
We can explicitly calculate β for the limit case where r → 0, and voters are extremely concentrated. As r → 0, EW approaches the welfare of the median voter,
Letβ define the value of β for which
. Note that EW < Ew M , and lim r→0 EW = Ew M . Therefore, for any β <β and for any v, there exists a value r such that vote welfare is decreasing in campaign informativeness.
Party concavity
Assuming power utility on behalf of the parties does not allow for a tractable analysis. We therefore introduce concavity of party preferences by assuming that they are quadratic in the difference between their ideology and the ideology of the winning candidate. Under quadratic party preferences, and linear voter preferences, the qualitative results from the body of the paper continue to hold: there exists parameter cases under which increased campaign informativeness decreases voter welfare.
When parties have concave preferences over policy outcomes, the analysis from the body of the paper is unchanged up until we get to the party expected payoff functions given δ L and δ R . For any δ L and δ R between 0 and δ P ,
The first order conditions of these functions with respect to the party's own candidate ideology are
Solving these equations for δ L and δ R give the equilibrium solution
The ideology of both candidates is strictly increasing in α. That is, both candidates become more extreme as either campaign becomes more informative.
Voter welfare is decreasing in campaign informativeness if
In the limit, as voters become concentrated (i.e., r → 1) and voters , G(δ * ) → 1 and this condition becomes (7) (4δ P + αv √ 2π) 2 8πδ P 2 √ 2π < 1, which holds for low enough v, since (4δ P ) 2 < 8πδ P 2 √ 2π ⇐⇒ 2 < π √ 2π. Similarly, for any v > 0 such that inequality (7) holds, there exists a range of r small enough such that ∂EW ∂α < 0. From this, we conclude that with quadratic party preferences, there exists a range of values for v and r such that voter welfare is decreasing in campaign informativeness.
Preference concavity for both voters and parties
Assuming power utility for both voters and parties, means any player with ideology ρ i (regardless of whether they are a party or a voter) experiences policy disutility −(|ρ w − ρ i |) β from the election of a candidate with ideology ρ w .
As we have already claimed, such an assumption over party preferences does not allow for a closed form derivation of δ * , making the analysis of voter welfare intractable. Despite this, the above analysis allows us to conclude that there exists a range of β ≥ 1 such that (when both voters and parties have power utility) voter welfare is decreasing in campaign informativeness as long as the distribution of voters is sufficiently concentrated around the median (i.e., as long as r is sufficiently small). This follows from the fact that result holds at β = 1 (as seen in the body of the paper), that the result holds for a range of β ≥ 1 when voter utility is concave and party utility is linear, that the result holds for β = 2 when party utility is concave and voter utility is linear, and the continuity of the problem.
EX ANTE ASYMMETRY
This section shows that the qualitative results from Sections 4 and 5 continue to hold when the party candidates differ in their ex ante expected quality. The following analysis assumes that voter ideology is distributed around the median voter according to N (0, r 2 ). The variance r represents how concentrated the population is around the median, with large r denoting a wide range of popular opinion, and r → 0 representing a special case where the entire voter population shares the same ideology.
Suppose that the prior belief about the quality of the party L candidate is q L ∼ N (µ L , 1), while the prior belief about quality for party R candidate is q R ∼ N (µ R , 1). The analysis is unchanged, up to the calculation of the distribution of the terms on the left hand side of equation (2). In the
When the prior means are different, the distribution of this term is different:
where m = µ L − µ R . Following the analysis in the text, we find that The expected payoff to the parties given their choices of δ are
Thus the first order conditions characterizing best-responses are
Because the standard normal density is symmetric around zero,
Thus, a Nash equilibrium with an interior optimum for each party (rather than a corner solution)
requires:
For the standard normal cdf, F (x) = F (−x) ⇐⇒ x = 0. Thus it must be that at interior optimum,
Observe that these equations also imply that at a Nash equilibrium with interior optimality, both parties are equally likely to win election. Combining this equation with either first order condition for party R gives the following:
This equation immediately implies that
Compared with the symmetric case, the party with the greater expected quality chooses a moreextreme position, while the other party adopts a more-moderate position. As long as the difference in the means, m, is less than v √ 2π 2 α both solutions are interior and constitute an equilibrium. If m is greater than this threshold, then the disadvantaged party perfectly moderates, running a candidate with the median voter's ideology. For subsequent welfare analysis, we focus on the case of small differences in ex ante means.
Unlike the case considered in the body, because the party positions are asymmetric, the election winner is not the candidate who generates the higher realized quality. Rather, the election winner is the candidate who generates a higher expected surplus for the median voter. Let Q j represent the ex ante distribution of the posterior mean of quality:
The expected surplus offered to the median voter at the interim stage is therefore
). As r → 0 the expected utility of the electorate approaches the expected utility of the median voter, which is simply E[max{U L , U R }]. According to a standard formula, the expected value of the maximum order statistic drawn from two independent normals, N (ν j , θ 2 j ) is given by
In this formula the two critical quantities are the difference in means, and the sum of the variances.
In our case, these evaluate as follows:
Thus, this formula evaluates to
The derivative of this expression with respect to α is given by
which becomes just
Because the largest value for the Normal pdf is
< 0, our result that voter welfare is decreasing in campaign informativeness when voters are sufficiently concentrated around the mean continues to hold. Our main result is robust to ex ante differentiation among candidates, provided this differentiation is not too large.
ENDOGENOUS CAMPAIGN INFORMATIVENESS
We incorporate the strategic choice of individual campaign informativeness σ i into the previous framework. Otherwise, the players, preferences and timing of the previous game are unchanged.
In the second stage, once candidates have been nominated and ideologies set, each candidate simultaneously chooses the σ j associated with its campaign. We allow for an exogenous limit on the informativeness of campaigns, in that each σ j cannot be less than some lower boundσ ≥ 0. That is, the candidates cannot make their signals more informative than the limit. The limit can be interpreted as a maximum campaign expenditure.
We consider Subgame Perfect equilibria of the following game:
1. Each party simultaneously nominates a candidate. That is, they choose the ideology ρ j of their candidate.
2. Candidates simultaneously choose how informative to make their campaigns. Each candidate j ∈ {L, R} selects the standard deviation of the signal observed by voters about his true quality, σ j ≥σ.
3. Voters observe the signals about the quality of the candidates, then cast ballots for their preferred candidate. The candidate who receives the majority of votes wins.
Subject to the constraint that σ j ≥σ, each candidate chooses their σ j to maximize the probability they win election. This is consistent with each candidate caring about either (or both) holding office or the ideology of the election winner. Because of this, the model is unchanged if we assume that parties choose the σ j of their candidates. 17
Equilibrium behavior
All voters cast ballots for the candidate that provide them with the highest expected payoff. Therefore, (as in the previous section) the median voter casting the deciding vote will elect candidate L if inequality (2) holds. Anticipating voters' responses, the candidates simultaneously choose σ L and σ R to maximize their expected payoffs. Because the parties choose candidate ideology in the first stage, in the second stage maximizing expected payoff is equivalent to choose the campaign strategy σ j that maximizes the probability of winning the election. To fully characterize candidate strategy, we must determine the choice of σ L and σ R for any combination of ρ L and ρ R selected in the first period.
Once ideology is set, candidate j chooses σ j to maximize the probability of winning election:
, where α (as previously defined) is a function of both σ L and σ R . The derivative of this probability with respect to σ j is
where ∂α ∂σ j = 1 2α −2σ j (1 + σ 2 j ) 2 < 0. Combining the above, it is simple to see that if δ k > δ j , then candidate j's payoff is strictly increasing in σ j , but if δ k < δ j then candidate j payoff is strictly decreasing in σ j . Thus, if candidate j is more moderate than candidate k, then candidate j prefers the least informative campaign possible (associated with largest value of σ j ), but if candidate j is more extreme than candidate k then j prefers the most informative campaign possible (smallest value of σ j ). Also notice that if δ k = δ j then the choice of campaign accuracy does not alter the election outcome, and therefore any combination (σ j , σ k ) is consistent with sequential rationality. δ k > δ j → σ j = ∞ and σ k =σ δ k = δ j → any feasible σ k and σ j are sequentially rational Because any σ L , σ R ≥σ are sequentially rational when δ L = δ R , in equilibrium the measure of campaign informativeness, α, may take on any value between α| σ L =σ R →∞ = 0 and α| σ j =0,σ k →∞ = 2 1+σ 2 . The more-restrictive the limitσ, the lower the maximum campaign informativeness that may be observed in equilibrium. When δ L = δ R , the measure of campaign informativeness, α simplifies to α| σ j =σ,σ k =∞ = 1 1 +σ 2 ≡ᾱ.
We use the variableᾱ to define this value of α that results from the sequentially-rational campaign strategies in any sub-game given δ L = δ R .
We derive an equilibrium in which parties choose candidates with symmetric ideology, δ L = δ R = δ * . No party can have an incentive to deviate from δ j = δ * in the first stage of the game.
If party i anticipates that δ j = δ * in period one, and chooses δ i = δ * , it expects a payoff 0. If it deviates by choosing δ i = δ * , then party i anticipates that in the campaign stage α =ᾱ. Therefore, the expected payoff of party i from choosing δ j = δ * is (8) Eu
where ρ P R = δ R and ρ P L = −δ L . In order for no deviation to exist, the maximum value of this function must be equal to 0. However, notice that substituting δ i = δ * into equation gives value 0. Thus, if δ i = δ * maximizes (8) then no beneficial deviation exists. The rest of the derivation is analogous to the case of exogenous variances:
This derivative must equal 0 at δ i = δ * , and thus:
In addition, the second order is satisfied at the critical point. To see this observe that the second derivative of (8) is given by
Evaluated at δ j = δ * gives −2f (0) 1 αv < 0 Therefore, given δ k = δ * , the best response is δ j = δ * .
As in the case with exogenous informativeness, an increase in the maximum permitted informativenessσ (which can be interpreted as an increase in the campaign spending limit) causes greater ideological extremism. Therefore, the same tradeoff is present in this case as in the model with exogenous informativeness. The only real difference in the results is driven by the result that with endogenous informativeness, any feasible level of informativeness can be selected on the equilibrium path. However, even if we assume that on the equilibrium path both campaigns are maximally informative, σ j = σ k =σ, we still find that if the electorate is sufficiently concentrated about the median, an increase in maximal permitted informativeness can damage aggregate voter welfare.
To see this, imagine that equilibrium path, campaign signals are maximally informative, σ j = σ k =σ. In this case, the expected quality on the equilibrium path is given by 2 1+σ 2 =ᾱ √ 2.
Thus, the benefits of campaign informativeness are higher in this case, because on the equilibrium path campaign informativeness is higher than off of the equilibrium path.
Given this differences, it is straightforward to derive aggregate voter welfare as a function ofᾱ:
4ᾱ represents the equilibrium level of ideological divergence chosen by each party. Following a similar argument to the one when α was exogenous, one can show that for anyᾱ, voter welfare is increasing with a more restrictive limit when
Note that 2 π √ 2 < 1. As in the earlier analysis, this implies that for anyᾱ, voters benefit from a more restrictive limit on campaign information if they care enough about quality relative to ideology, or if the distribution of voter ideology is sufficiently concentrated around the median.
When equation (9) holds with equality, thenᾱ maximizes welfare, and when the left hand side is less than the right hand side, a less restrictive limit is preferred.
